THE EVOLUTION OF ARMY TRAINING MANAGEMENT DOCTRINE 1945 to 1988

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

ANTHONY J. GASBARRE, JR., MAJ, USA
B.S., USMA, West Point, New York, 1979

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1992



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
	5 June 1992	Master's Thesis, 5 Aug91-5 June 1992

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
The Evolution of Army Training Management Doctrine, 1945-1988

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S)
MAJ Anthony J. Gasbarre, Jr., USA

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Attn: ATZL-SWD-GD
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

This study traces the evolution of Army training management doctrine from 1945 to 1988. It explores the changes that have taken place in the doctrine by examining the purpose of training, key training concepts, the training process, and the operational doctrine of the time. The study takes a chronological look at training doctrine and develops three major themes to categorize training management. They are; 1945 to 1974, "Train to Time," 1975 to 1984, "Train to Standard," and 1985 to 1988, "Train to Mission." Conclusions of the study indicate the reasons for the changes in Army training management doctrine since 1945. This study emphasizes the importance of understanding training and provides information on implications of training management doctrine.

14. SUBJECT TERMS	15. NUMBER OF PAGES
Training Management, Battalion Training Management System, Mission Essential Task List, Performance Oriented Training Training the Force	103
	16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	

THE EVOLUTION OF TRAINING MANAGEMENT DOCTRINE 1945 to 1988

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

ANTHONY J. GASBARRE, JR., MAJ, USA
B.S., USMA, West Point, New York, 1979

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1992

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate: Major Anthony J. Gasbarre, Jr.

Title of thesis: The Evolution of Army Training Management Doctrine, 1945 to 1988.

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chairman
MAJ J.R. Swanson, M.P.A.

_____, Member
Dr. C.R. Gabel, Ph.D.

_____, Member
LTC R.E. Schupner, M.S.



_____, Member
Mr. H. Weeks

Accepted this 5th day of June 1992 by:

_____, Director, Graduate
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE EVOLUTION OF ARMY TRAINING MANAGEMENT DOCTRINE, 1945 TO 1988 by MAJ Anthony J. Gasbarre, Jr., USA, 102 pages

This study traces the evolution of Army training management doctrine from 1945 to 1988. It explores the changes that have taken place in the doctrine by examining the purpose of training, key training concepts, the training management process, and the operational doctrine of the time.

The study takes a chronological look at training doctrine and develops three major themes to categorize training management. They are; 1945 to 1974, "Train to Time," 1975 to 1984, "Train to Standard," and 1985 to 1988, "Train to Mission."

Conclusions of the study indicate the reasons for the changes in Army training management doctrine since 1945. This study emphasizes the importance of understanding training and provides information on future implications of training management doctrine.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1

NATURE OF THE STUDY

Introduction

Training is the mainstay of an army's ability to be successful on the battlefield.

> Only through high training requirements, rigidly enforced can low casualty rates be possible. Only well armed and equipped, adequately trained and efficiently led forces can expect victory in future combat.[1]

The way we manage training is key to executing our warfighting capability. In light of the success of operations Just Cause and Desert Storm, and the subsequent reduction in force taking place, it becomes more apparent that the management of training is critical. Since World War II, there have been significant changes in the methodology for organizing and executing training. The primary vehicle for this has been the Army's training management doctrine. These changes are revealed through the study of the evolution of the Army's training literature. They are reflected in the

---

[1]U.S. Army, FM 25-100, Training the Force (Washington: Department of the Army, 1988), 4-1.

form of field manuals, training circulars, training booklets, and Army regulations. In addition to the written medium for the communication of training management doctrine, one can trace changes in the methods by which doctrines have been taught in military schools and in units. These latter methods sometimes cause changes in doctrine much faster than does the written form.

The focus of this study will be to identify the changes in training management doctrine after World War II, and outline the reasons behind the changes. To help put the study into perspective it is important to understand the link between training and the past performance of the United States Army in combat. Traditionally the U.S. has not fared well in its opening battles. In fact, up through the beginning of the Vietnam War, the U.S. has either lost its opening battle, or, if victory was achieved, it was at an extremely high cost in the lives of its soldiers. The track record of the Army begs the question, "'How have we prepared for war and gone to war in the past?'"[2] One of the root causes for the Army's unpreparedness has been the competing demands of peacetime tasks versus wartime requirements.

> Headquarters in the U.S. Army habitually expend their time and energies on routine administration,

---

[2]Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, America's First Battles, 1776-1965, ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft (Lawrence, Ks: University Press of Kansas, 1986), ix.

seldom pushing, training, and testing themselves....[3]

Other factors contributing to the Army's unpreparedness can be linked to the budget and the nature and history of the country's feelings about large standing armies. This country grew up with an immense distrust of the power possessed by standing armies, derived in part from the fact that the British Army was quartered in the homes of the colonials. It is easy to see how these feelings came about. The use of small local militias was reinforced as a result of these feelings. Besides, there rarely were substantial threats to the sovereignty of the nation so who needs such a large army?

As war became more lethal and larger in scale, mobilization met wartime demands, and the country went through a series of expansions and reductions in the size of the Army. This continues to be a factor even today. This cycle of expanding and shrinking reveals much about the nature of training and training management through the end of World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam. The slow continual build-up of the U.S. Army since the early 1980's also represents a swing toward a larger standing army for the following decade.

---

[3]John Shy, "First Battles in Retrospect" in America's First Battles, 1776-1965, ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft (Lawrence, Ks: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 330.

This, in itself, had an impact on how the Army manages its training. In light of the recent downsizing of the army it will be interesting to see what the impact will be on the nature of future training management doctrine.

Studies on the evolution of operational doctrine also help to put this study into perspective. Parallels in the development of operational and training management doctrine help shed light on the causes of change. Since operational doctrine reflects the concepts of "How We Intend to Fight," it should drive "How We Train to Fight." Examining the evolution of our warfighting doctrines enables us to identify and understand the key players that were instrumental in the training management doctrine. They normally held the reins on all the literature and doctrine being produced. Understanding the interrelationship of operational doctrine and training management doctrine helps one understand the significance of this study.

The Research Question

The primary question to be answered is: "What have been the changes in the Army's Training Management Doctrine since the end of World War II?" The intent of this thesis will be to outline from an historical perspective the changes in training management doctrine during the period 1945 to 1988. Changes will be outlined

over time answers to secondary questions will develop the reasoning behind the changes.

Several secondary questions are derived from the thesis and are used to answer the primary research question. They are:

1. What were the driving factors that prompted changes in the army's training management doctrine?

2. Were the changes prompted by the threat, warfighting doctrine, experience, events, lessons learned, or other reasons?

3. Who were the key players in the change?

4. Were the changes revolutionary or evolutionary, and if so why?

5. What was the environment for change?

6. What is the importance of understanding the changes in training management doctrine?

7. What are the implications for the future?

It must be noted that these questions were used as a road map for discussion of the problem. Only the most important questions were answered.

Background and Context of the Problem and the Research Question

In the backdrop of the breakup of the former Soviet Union, the unification of the two Germanies, the Yugoslavian civil war, and our own country's economic woes, we live in an environment of unpredictable change. It is not unlike the conditions that existed prior to World War I. We have a tendency to look back at the mistakes of our predecessors and draw the incorrect conclusions from them. It is important to understand not only the changes in the past but to understand why they happened.

The United States emerged victorious from World War II, the only nation possessing nuclear capability, and one of the few nations whose land was not significantly marred by the destructive power of war. The prospect of any future conflict was remote. The Army was shrinking to its traditional small peacetime size. Changing national interests and objectives were being thrust on the country, which under normal circumstances would have preferred returning to a role of lesser involvement around the world.

Since World War II there have been significant changes in how the Army has organized, trained and fought. There have been many studies in recent history devoted to the development of operational doctrine or

some portion of this doctrine. Some include, but are not limited to; The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, by Major Robert A. Doughty, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982, by John L. Romjue, Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II, by Dr. Christopher R. Gabel, and Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, by Major Paul H. Herbert. It is as a result of these studies that the interest in how the Army changes the manner in which it trains to fight emerged. Since the primary mission of the Army is to "be trained and ready in peacetime to deter war."[4], it is important to fill a training management void that exists which parallels the study of operational doctrine.

Assumptions

The first, and probably most important assumption is that there is a distinct difference between the doctrine of how the Army fights and how the Army trains to fight. This sets the foundation for recognizing that separate systems exist for the production of the two types of doctrine. It must also be understood that the need for both exists, and that there is a close relationship

---

[4]FM 25-100 (1988), 1.

between the two systems. It is important to understand this since, there are periods of time where no apparent link exists between what our operational doctrine and training management doctrine says.

It must be assumed that training management is applicable to the total force, both Active and Reserve Components, and that the differences exist in techniques, not in the doctrine itself. This is not to say that both AC and RC can train the same way, but rather that the principles involved are the same.

Although we will see that training management doctrine says that there are principles by which it is governed, these principles are not immutable. We must assume that training management is a dynamic process that is influenced by change.

Finally it will be assumed that the need for training management will increase in importance in the future. Training management must continually adapt to meet the needs of the Total Army.

Definitions

It is important to understand that over time definitions of terms may change. The reason this is mentioned is that in an historical analysis the reader must look at the subject from the perspective of the time. Having said this, many of the definitions of

terms may change as we progress chronologically through the study. For example the 1950 version of FM 21-5, Military Training, says that "The ultimate purpose of all military training is to prepare military personnel to carry out efficiently and expeditiously the responsibilities of the Army in accomplishing its mission."[5] This helps us to understand the scope of the definition, namely, "military personnel" only. It did not include Department of the Army civilians, as does current doctrine. Note that four definitions are given to several terms to represent different periods of time covered by this study. Some of these terms are defined here. Most will be defined throughout the study.

1. Doctrine: "Fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment."[6]

2. Training Management:

a. "The planning and direction of training to accomplish the training mission in the time and with the means available."[7]

---

[5]U.S. Army, FM21-5, Military Training (Washington: Department of the Army, 1950), 1.

[6]FM 25-100 (1988), Glossary-4.

[7]FM 21-5 (1950), 17.

b. "Involves the planning, directing, programming, and supervising necessary to accomplish the assigned training mission or requirement in the specified time limit."[8]

c. "The art of employing limited resources (human, physical, financial, and time) in a manner that permits efficient and effective development of individuals and units so they can successfully accomplish their peace and wartime missions."[9]

d. "The process used by Army leaders to identify training requirements and subsequently plan, resource, execute, and evaluate training."[10]

3. Purpose of Training:

a. "The ultimate purpose of all military training is to prepare military personnel to carry out efficiently and expeditiously the responsibilities of the Army in accomplishing its mission."[11]

b. "To attain and maintain the Army at a state of operational effectiveness which will assume the capability of closing with and destruction of the enemy

---

[8]U.S. Army, FM 21-5, Military Training Management (Washington: Department of the Army, 1964), 19.

[9]U.S. Army, FM 21-6, How to Prepare and Conduct Military Training (Washington: Department of the Army, 1975), 171.

[10]FM 25-100 (1988), Glossary-7.

[11]FM 21-5 (1950), 1.

through prompt and sustained combat operation on land, including the seizure, defense or occupation of land, alone or jointly with Navy, Air Force, or both, and to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations including the support of friendly or allied counterinsurgency operations."[12]

c. "The purpose of training is to prepare soldiers, teams, and units for job performance."[13]

d. "The Army training mission is to prepare soldiers, leaders, and units to deploy, fight, and win in combat at any intensity level, anywhere, anytime."[14]

4. Training: "The instruction of personnel to individually and collectively increase their capacity to perform specific military functions and tasks."[15]

5. Training Requirement: "The difference between demonstrated and desired levels of proficiency."[16]

---

[12] FM 21-5 (1964), 2.

[13] FM 21-6 (1975), 4.

[14] FM 25-100 (1988), 1-1.

[15] Ibid., Glossary-7.

[16] Ibid., Glossary-7.

6. Performance-oriented Training: "Training that involves learning by doing. Performance to standard is required."[17]

7. Task: "A clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by soldiers and units. Tasks are specific activities which contribute to the accomplishment of encompassing missions or other requirements."[18]

8. Standard: "The minimum acceptable proficiency required in the performance of a particular training task."[19]

Limitations

There are very limited sources that deal directly with the subject of training management doctrine. Many of the references deal with related subjects, or lessons from past experience.

Delimitations

The scope of analysis for this thesis is restricted to the specific time period of 1945 to 1988. The year 1945 is important for several reasons. The nuclear age begins and for the first time the United States emerges as a true world leader. The scope of the

---

[17]Ibid., 1-4.

[18]Ibid., Glossary-7.

[19]Ibid., Glossary-7.

background is greater than the specified time period. This helps provide needed understanding and introductory information.

Analysis was restricted to Army training management doctrine. Operational doctrine will be analyzed only to the extent of the impact it has on the formulation of training management doctrine. It is not the intent of this study to conduct a critical analysis of operational doctrine.

Significance of the Study

Training is a significant part of the peacetime Army today. If we, as an Army, do not understand why we train the way we do, we surely will not be able to implement our operational doctrine. Today's Army spends an incredible amount of money capturing and using lessons learned as a means of educating its officers, non-commissioned officers, soldiers, and civilians. Knowing where, how and when our training management doctrine evolved helps us to better understand why we train the way we do. Ignoring these lessons or drawing the wrong conclusions from the past could have a costly effect not only in dollars but in human pain and suffering in peacetime and in war. The motto "No more

Task Force Smiths,"[20] best describes the results. What he was referring to was the performance by the U.S. ground forces in their first battle of the Korean War. We can no longer be unprepared when a conflict occurs. One can only look at the results of ignoring or drawing the wrong conclusions from ninetieth century warfare and see the devastating effects it had during World War I. Many see the same conditions that existed then in today's society.

The ability to look back and apply lessons learned at little or no cost is truly a valuable tool. In this respect it is important for our officers and non-commissioned officers to understand how and why our training management doctrine came about. We can ill-afford a similar deterioration of training such as we saw during the post World War II era through the early 1970's.

This study not only has historical significance to those in the military, it allows leaders in both business and government to better understand the process by which the Army prepares itself to go to war. As in most cases, a sharing of this knowledge also benefits the other sectors of society it touches. Many past training programs and principles adopted by the Army

---

[20]Michael P.W. Stone and Gordon R. Sullivan, "The United States Army Posture Statement, FY 93," (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1992), 10.

have direct links to organizational and individual training techniques devised in the civilian sector. One example is the adoption of criterion-referenced instruction used by such companies as Xerox and Pacific Gas and Electric Company.[21] This study, in turn, could serve as a medium for this exchange. The Army's current training management process promotes both efficient and effective use of resources. In this respect this study has direct applications to civil and industry training needs.

Understanding why the Army trains the way it does helps leaders from all sectors of society to better link the Army's training needs to national interests, procurement, and the budget process. It is easy to understand the number of flight hours fighter pilots require to maintain proficiency. This makes it easy to attach the number of dollars to the program. The costs associated with operating a fleet are easily measured. But how do you attach a cost to attaining the desired level of proficiency of an armored division? If we understand the training management process, we may be closer to justifying these costs.

Finally, this study will help fill a knowledge gap that has resulted from the numerous studies on

---

[21]U.S. Army, "Army Training Study," (Washington: Department of the Army, 1978), D-7.

operational doctrine. It is understandable that the training management topic may not be as enjoyable to read about or research, but it is no less important to address. Facilitating the understanding of training management doctrine and its reliance on operational doctrine is the intent of this study. This will help the Army's leaders to more effective managers of training.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Introduction

There are a variety of sources dealing with the development of training management doctrine. Other sources reviewed do not deal directly with the subject; but, those sources help explain the environment of change, providing facts that shed light on the thesis.

It is the intent of this review to expand the existing body of knowledge on the subject of training management doctrine. This review includes numerous books, government documents, studies, periodicals, articles, and training management literature. For the most part there is little information specifically addressing the subject. The information is usually interwoven into other subjects such as the Army's preparedness, operational doctrine, and leadership. This makes perfectly good sense since these play important roles in how and why the Army trains. But since in peacetime the major activity is training, the goal is to expand the limited amount of information available. Training readiness has been the principal reason for the majority of the

U.S. Army's failings in past conflicts. More attention should be spent on understanding why.

Books

There are few books that deal exclusively with training in the Army. Those that do rarely talk to the pluses or minuses of the doctrine. Unlike studies of operational failures and successes, which usually point to the state of the doctrine, successes and failures in training are usually attributed to other problems, such as time, money, and leadership. For the most part, books about the Army center around specific events (i.e. the Korean War) or are less specific and deal with the broader subject such as the history of the Army. One of the few training specific works is Common Sense Training, by LTG(Ret) Arthur S. Collins, Jr. Collins served the Army for over forty years and commanded at every level up to field army. He is eminently qualified as an expert in the field of training. General Collins draws his conclusions on first hand experience and proves himself a capable, trained observer of the training environment. LTG Collins offers some interesting insights to the problems of training during the 1960's and early 1970's. This is especially useful since it was written during the period of time that many believe to be a watershed era for thought on the subject of training.

Some of the topics, in the book, useful for this study are, "What Happened? Where did We go Astray?",[1] and "Training Management."[2] Collins gives us insight to the problems of the Army of the time such as the lack of knowledge of the officer corps on how to conduct training. Another problem cited by Collins was the focus of service schools on topics other than training, such as, "international affairs and national strategy."[3] General Collins offers some hard hitting and sometimes hard to swallow reasons for the poor state of training that existed in the Army at the time. He also offers some solutions to these problems. Overall, the core of his argument is that the "Social and organizational changes, as well as heavy demands on the Army, contributed to the deterioration of training."[4] Although the book does not address training doctrine directly, it does address the lack of knowledge of how to train, which is an indirect indictment of the doctrine of the time. One drawback to the book is that no bibliography is included to further research on the subject of training. Some footnotes are included.

---

[1]Arthur S. Collins, Jr., Common Sense Training (Novato, Ca.: Presidio Press, 1983), vi.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., 14.

[4]Ibid., 19.

A similar work is Crisis in Command, by Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage. The authors were both commissioned officers and have some first hand experience as observers. It offers a more direct indictment of the officer corps as the main cause to the Army's problems during the Vietnam era. The authors use surveys, most of which were conducted by the Army itself, to draw their conclusions from. The hypothesis focuses on the idea that the Army from 1961-71 was on the verge of total disintegration, largely due to the lack of a professional officer corps. Again, only some inferences to training are made, but it offers insight to the environment under which the Army was operating during a period of great transition. The effects of the Reduction In Forces (RIF) on the training state of the officer corps of the early 1970's is interesting and may have applications to what is currently happening in the Army. An extensive bibliographical essay and bibliography is included.

America's First Battles, 1976-1965, is a study of the performance of the American Army in their first battles of major conflicts. The book is a series of articles by historians collected into one volume. The authors look at the prewar conditions of the Army and comment on the Army's state of preparation. The peacetime training condition is one aspect. How the Army prepares itself is the fundamental thrust of the collection. Included in this preparation is

the training that was conducted prior to conflict. It provides a snapshot of how well prepared the Army was and some reasons why. A majority of information collected from the battles since World War II are from personal interviews. An extensive bibliography is included.

Korea. The Untold Story of the War, by Joseph C. Goulden, provides information on the state of readiness of the U.S. Army at the start of the war. It focuses on the mind-set of the time which believed that since the United States possessed nuclear capability there was no real need for the conventional Army. The book gives insight on the attitude of the Army leadership and that of the soldiers just prior to the start of the conflict. The rapid mobilization that took place also explains why the U.S. Army trained the way it did during this period of time.

This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness, by T.R. Fehrenbach, is a study in how ill-prepared the U.S. Army was at the start of the Korean War. One of the main premises of the book is the lack of training readiness the Army allowed itself to be in when the conflict began. This book reveals the cost of war when a nation takes for granted that nuclear deterrence can prevent a conventional war.

General histories provide information on environment and preparedness. History of the United States Army, by Russell F. Weigley, provides information as to the focus of training during the post World War II era. Emphasis was

clearly on providing for an Army that could be trained quickly should the need arise.

Studies

Studies have been an excellent tool for capturing the mechanisms for change in the training management arena. They provide more focus to the thesis and help bridge gaps in the information provided by books. There is significant information on training in this field which has aided in the conduct of this study. Two basic types of studies were used in the conduct of research for this thesis. They are studies that deal directly with the subject of training and those that deal with the development of operational doctrine. The latter have proved extremely useful since the operational doctrine should drive how the Army trains. The four most useful studies of doctrine are:

The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76, by Major Robert A. Doughty.

From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982, by John L. Romjue.

Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, by Major Paul H. Herbert.

"AirLand Battle Doctrine: Evolution or Revolution? A Look Inside the U.S. Army," by Aaron Blumenfeld.

Each of the above studies gives in-depth information on how the operational doctrine of the Army came about. The studies provide important insights on the doctrinal process, and the main influences that caused any changes. Fundamental changes in operational doctrine directly effected the training management doctrine. The studies give detailed information on the key players involved and their interactions with others. Especially helpful are accounts of lessons learned from events such as the Korean War, Vietnam, and the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict. The 1973 War has proved to be one of the most important events causing the most dramatic change in both operational and training management doctrine. These studies are thoroughly researched and documented works that provide excellent first hand accounts and bibliographical sources.

There are several training studies that have proven to be invaluable to the research of this thesis. The "Army Training Study," 1977-78 provides an explanation of the concepts of the Army training system. It gives both an historical study of training since World War II, and provides the current (1977-78) status of training management. In addition, it provides what was believed to be the future thought of the time for training. This study gives a detailed analysis of the entire training system, including an overview of the Army training system, unit training programs, training proficiency, readiness and combat

effectiveness, resource cost of training, individual training, sustainment training, and reserve component training.[5] The bibliography is probably one of the most comprehensive on the subject of training for its time.

Unit Training: How it is Evaluated and Reported to Congress, General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C., 1986. "GAO examined how the Department of Defense (DOD) evaluates the effect of unit training on the readiness and whether the evaluation results could be useful to the Congress as it makes budget decisions on training."[6] The study compares sources of training readiness between the services but they could not find "any one measure that assures a commander his unit is adequately trained."[7] The report contains a limited bibliography of additional studies that the GAO has conducted in the past.

"Perspectives on Battalion Training Management," Final Report, Human Resources Research Organization, Alexandria, Va., Sep 79 - Sep 80. "Four battalion commanders were interviewed at length to explore their philosophies and goals for training, their training management practices, and training and evaluation techniques. Other topics discussed

---

[5]"Army Training Study," ii.

[6]U.S. Congress, Unit Training. How it is Evaluated and Reported to the Congress (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 2.

[7]Ibid., 12.

were ways the staff positions were utilized, the ways that commanders prepared for command, and the utility of training management doctrine and guidance."[8]

"Automation Impact Study of Army Training Management," Battelle Pacific Northwest Labs., Richland, Wa., January 1988. The main objectives of this impact study were to identify the potential cost savings associated with automated Army training management.[9]

The Army's Training Revolution 1973 - 1990 an Overview, by Anne W. Chapman, Office of the Command Historian, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. This study provides an outstanding overview of the total training system from 1973 to 1990. It raises many issues and attempts to answer the questions of the changing training world. The perspective taken focuses on the personalities involved in the changes in training. Little detail is devoted to why changes were made. More emphasis is placed on what was changed and who changed it. This chronological study centers around the TRADOC Commanders and their contributions to Army training. It lacks a bibliography but footnotes provide information helpful to further research.

---

[8]Human Resources Research Organization, Perspectives on Battalion Training Management, (Alexandria, VA, 1981), NTIS, ADA1270578XSP.

[9]Battelle Pacific Northwest Labs., Automation Impact Study of Army Training Management, (Richland, WA, 1988), NTIS, DE88005550XSP.

"Changing an Army, An Oral History of General William E. DePuy, USA Retired," by LTC Romie L. Brownlee and LTC William J. Mullen, III, United States Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. This study is presented in the form of an interview and is especially useful due to its firsthand information. One portion of the study is particularly helpful. That portion that deals with DePuy's time as the TRADOC Commander, 1973-77.

"The Battalion Commander's Guide to Successful Training Management," by, Major Gary S. Willison, MMAS Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1980. This study attempts to determine if a desk side training management job aid would be a useful tool for battalion commanders for the management of individual and unit training. The investigation is focused on training gaps which exist at battalion level. The investigation reveals that a distinct need for a training management job aid exists.[10] Some information on the Battalion Training Management System is valuable. It has a very limited bibliography.

"Train as You Will Fight: Factors Affecting Development of a Strategy to Train National Guard Units to the Level Organized," by Major Anthony L. Barnhill, ARNG, MMAS Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1990. This study gives

---

[10]Gary S. Willison, "The Battalion Commander's Guide to Successful Training Management," (MMAS Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1980), iii.

perspective on training National Guard units to the level organized by evaluating several factors affecting the Guard's ability to do so. The problem is not new but has taken on new relevance as the US military undergoes the challenges of major reorganization. The study evaluates current Army training doctrine and regulatory guidance to ascertain whether clearly defined training strategies aimed at the peculiarities of the National Guard training environment exist. The study also examines documents outlining future training directions for the standing Army and the National Guard against the same criteria.[11]

"Implementation of FM 25-100 in the Heavy Division," by D.F. Walters, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., 16 Feb. 1990. The purpose of this study is to assess how well the implementation of FM 25-100 and its principles are progressing in a heavy division stationed at Fort Hood, Texas. The results are presented using selected topics from FM 25-100.[12]

"Forces Training Management Assessment," is an unpublished study conducted from January to May 1988 and briefed to the Army Chief of Staff. The objectives of the

---

[11]Anthony L. Barnhill, "Train as You Intend to Fight: Factors Affecting Devlopment of a Strategy to Train National Guard Units to the Level Organized," (MMAS Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), iii.

[12]D.F. Walters, "Implementation of FM 25-100 in the Heavy Division," Individual Study Project, U.S. Army War College, 1990, NTIS, ADA2224814XSP.

study were to determine the effectiveness of training guidance to the battalion level; programming and planning for mission essential training of battalions; scheduling, execution, and evaluation of training for and within battalions and staffs; division and installation level management of training detractors and training resources; and training management instruction provided in leader courses by Army schools. It identifies problem areas and recommends solutions to correct deficiencies.[13]

Periodicals

Periodicals offer good snapshots of the current thought on a subject at the time of publication. The majority, if not all the publications used in this study are military in nature. Some articles have had more impact than others. For example, one of the most effective articles espousing the philosophy of what was later to become the current doctrine was "Training in the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized)," by LTC William R. Lynch and CPT Garth T. Bloxham, Military Review, September, 1983. Several different periodicals were used in the conduct of this study.

---

[13]Author was a member of the assessment team. Summary from outbrief packet.

CAC and TRADOC Historical Reviews

Reviews provide an historical framework from which to continue further research. They can in some cases provide the reasoning behind the changes in the training management doctrine. Reviews also provide an accurate "on the record" account of a given period of time. They represent a conscious effort to preserve the mechanisms of change through an historical document. They provide the researcher an almost first hand account for review and give insight to decisions and the key players that made the decisions. Usually included in the reviews are supporting evidence such as policy letters and message traffic. Reviews are normally conducted on a semi-annual basis to help preserve the accuracy of the information.

Training Literature

Review of the training literature offers the most concrete way of answering the primary research question, "What have been the changes in Army training management doctrine since World War II?" It allows you to chronologically compare one version of field manual to the next and outline any differences that are found. Although it is important to the thesis, analyzing the literature does not get to the "why?" of the problem.

The term "training literature" is used in a broader sense than is traditionally known. I have included as

training literature field manuals, training bulletins, training circulars, field circulars, Army regulations,and pamphlets.

Conclusions

In summary, the current state of literature on the subject of training is vast. In terms of this thesis it is very limited. There is, however, sufficient information available to answer the primary question. This was done through a thorough analysis of the training management doctrine. The secondary questions were answered through the analysis of other sources available for research.

It is the intent of this study to shed light on an area of training that has been virtually forgotten, training management doctrine. It is surprising that in light of the voluminous amounts of information that exist on the subject of operational doctrine, "How We Fight," little exists on, "How We Train to Fight."

A final goal of this chapter is to provide the reader with topics for further research. The wide range of literature and wide timeframe covered by this study should accommodate this outcome.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Explanation of How Research was Conducted

Initial research began with the focus of answering the primary research question.[1] This was conducted by gathering sources of information primarily from training management literature that was in the form of Army Field Manuals. Critical examination was the methodology used to review the literature. There are two parts to critical examination. The first is external criticism. This approach looks at the literature source for its authenticity. This technique was widely used when the authenticity of many documents was doubtful. Today there is less chance of this occurring and therefore was not used for the literature review. The second method uses the technique of analyzing the meaning of statements in the document to determine their

---

[1]U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, ST 20-10, Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Research and Thesis (Fort Leavenworth: Department of the Army, 1991), 14.

"accuracy, trustworthiness, and sincerity."[2] This method leads the historian to several questions that must be asked about the usefulness of the literature being reviewed. The are:

> Is the writer of a given document a good authority? Was he an eyewitness? If so, can his testimony be relied on?
>
> Is he a trained observer?[3]

Answering these questions allow for "the careful analysis of the sifted data to determine its meaning and significance."[4] Reading the actual manuals would identify trends in the structure of the literature (i.e. the physical layout of the manuals) or patterns in the methods by which the Army organized its training. Both were found. As research continued similarities, over a long period of time were observed as were distinct changes in both the design of the manuals and what was being said in them. After this abrupt change a second pattern emerged. This pattern did not continue for as long as the previous one, nor was it as abrupt. But it was a clear change nonetheless.

---

[2]Maurice Matloff, "The Nature of History," in A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History, eds. John E. Jessup, Jr. and Robert W. Coakley, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 10.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid., 12.

The research focus changed slightly toward the time periods where changes seemed to happen. These transition periods are from 1973 to 1974, and 1982 to 1984. The approach now began to focus on describing what made these two time periods different. This is the point where the secondary research questions were developed. They focus on the "Why's?" for change. Once the secondary questions were developed it was important for developing a construct for comparing the time periods of relative stability in the training management doctrine. What emerged as the methodology for this thesis was descriptive analysis of the series of training management manuals from 1945 to 1988. This description outlines the changes in the training management concepts throughout the period covered by the study. The strategy for the collection of this information is discussed below.

Strategy for Collection of Evidence

The strategy for collection of evidence centered around the primary research question: What have been the changes in Army training management doctrine since World War II? To narrow the scope of the collection and to aid in the analysis and interpretation of the evidence, collection has encompassed four major areas. They are: the Purpose of Training; Training Concepts; the Training Management

Process; and Operational Doctrine. These four areas will be examined across the timeframe of 1945 to 1988.

For ease of collection, the overall timeframe has been subdivided into three periods based on similarities in the doctrine. The first period of time is from 1945 to 1974. This period will be labeled "Train to Time," since time was such a dominating factor in how the U.S. Army prepared itself for war. The second period is from 1975 to 1984. "Train to Standard" best describes how the Army prepared for battle during this phase. The third and final period are the years from 1985 to 1988. The overriding principle that best describes the Army during this phase is, "Train to Mission." A detailed review of each of these periods of time, against the four major areas outlined above, will shape the construct for analysis and interpretation.

One technique used was written requests for information in the form of a letter. Letters were sent to key persons involved directly with the development of Army training management doctrine. It was the intent of these letters to gain written or oral first-hand accounts detailing any reasons for changes in the training management doctrine during the transition periods. Letters were sent to General (Ret) William E. DePuy, TRADOC Commander, 1 July 1973 - 30 June 1977 and General (Ret) Carl E. Vuono, TRADOC

Commander, 30 June 1986 - 12 June 1987. Copies of the letters are found at the Appendix.

Analysis of Information

Across each period of time a comparison was made between the purpose of training, training concepts, the training management process, and operational doctrine. It is during these major time periods that the primary research question will be answered. Focusing on the two transition periods answers the secondary questions. Not all secondary questions are answered for each time period. Only the ones that are most important to the period of time are addressed.

Interpretation of Information

Interpretation of the information focuses on supporting the three major premises of training to time, standard, and mission, along with documenting the changes of training management doctrine over time. In addition to this, the interpretation of the evidence will answer the reasons for change during the transition periods.

Strengths and Weakness of Methodology

As in any research method there are inherent strengths and weaknesses. The major weakness in any historical perspective is in the interpretation of the evidence. Interpretation can lead to a variety of opinions.

By comparing the doctrinal training manuals side by side the hope is to minimize the interpretation by showing concrete evidence of change. In addition, by gaining first-hand information from key players involved in the development of training management doctrine, there will be a smaller chance of second-guessing why the changes were made and what influenced these changes.

CHAPTER 4

TRAIN TO TIME

Introduction

After World War II, as after previous major conflicts, the thought of another war was incomprehensible. The United States was the only country in the world possessing nuclear weapons which made it the most powerful nation on earth. This fact alone made many believe that should some future enemy emerge the U.S. would simply use the atomic weaponry to solve the problem. With this in mind, "it was difficult for many to foresee how a mass army produced by universal military training might be needed."[1]

This prevailing belief led to cutbacks in the Army's overall strength and at the time of the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, February 1948, "the Army's effective combat strength was down to two and one-third divisions."[2]

---

[1]Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), 500.

[2]Ibid., 501.

But this was typical of the American aversion to large standing armies. The cycle of growth and reduction was the traditional method for handling past crises and would continue even until after the Vietnam War. Besides, this method had proven successful since the Civil War so no clear reason to change was evident. The impact this had on training sets the tone for how the Army developed its training doctrine and how it subsequently trained its soldiers and units. "Peacetime training in general was much less rigorous than that of the war years; especially it lacked combat simulation, which would have posed dangers distasteful to postwar public opinion."[3] The United States' strength was in its ability to train large numbers of soldiers and to mobilize relatively quickly. This methodology was clearly reflected in the Army's training management doctrine of the time and remained constant from 1945 to 1974.

The intent of this chapter is to illustrate that the training management doctrine from 1945 to as late as 1974 was guided by the concept of "Train to Time." Time played such an important role that it permeated the purpose of training, key training concepts, training management process, and is tied to the operational doctrine. A look at the above areas will clearly illustrate this.

---

[3]Ibid., 503.

Purpose of Training

The purpose of training was key to understanding how the Army trained. From 1945 to 1974 it is evident that the purpose of training was to rapidly increase the size of the Army to meet its wartime needs. This was clearly outlined in the doctrine of the time. Time became the driving force in the way the Army prepared itself for war in peacetime. "The ultimate purpose of all military training is to prepare military personnel to carry out efficiently and expeditiously the responsibilities of the Army in accomplishing its mission."[4] The emphasis was on the "expeditiously." This trend can be found in the training management doctrine as late as 1974. One of the key reasons for this preoccupation with time was the past requirement during periods of conflict to increase the size of the Army. "The Army's training system is based on the need for quickly expanding its peacetime size with effective units in the event of mobilization."[5] This rapid expansion stressed time as the key element for success in times of crisis. Another example is found in the 1959 version of FM 21-5, Military Training, which states that maintaining a small Army with the capability to rapidly expand in times of national emergency was the

---

[4]U.S. Army, FM 21-5, Military Training (Washington: Department of the Army, 1957), 10.

[5]U.S. Army, FM 21-5, Military Training (Washington: Department of the Army, 1959), 6.

United States' traditional policy, and that "time is critical during mobilization, training requirements during that period must be reduced to essentials."[6] Time was critical during periods of mobilization, but the doctrine of the day also reflected the importance of time in the training of units. "The training to develop a unit is accomplished in two stages. The first stage is to attain an adequate status of operational proficiency in a minimum of time...."[7]

In most of the training manuals of the period of time from 1945 to 1974, specific mention is made of the concept of time management. While this is not uncommon to the training management doctrine of the other two periods covered by this study, it is important to look at what a significant role time played in the doctrine of this period. For example, in the 1950 version of FM 21-5, Military Training, when talking about time available, "It does not change the list of essential subjects. It does affect the scope of the essential subjects...."[8] This does not mean the scope in terms of the subject being trained, this means the number of hours used to train. If you ran out of hours you simply trained on that subject at a quicker pace or covered less material. Part of the reason for this was the method for

---

[6]FM 21-5 (1957), 6.

[7]FM 21-5 (1959), 18.

[8]FM 21-5 (1950), 24.

organizing training. Throughout the period of 1945 to 1974 the training management doctrine used master training programs which dictated the required number of hours that must be devoted to training a given task. The assumption was that if you train for the specified task the required number of hours, that task will be trained to proficiency. Examples of these master programs are found at figures 1 and 2.

The most convincing evidence to the "Train to Time" concept is found in the 1964 version of FM 21-5, Military Training Management. It states:

> In accordance with AR 350-1, a 44-hour, 5 1/2 day week is considered as a basis for scheduling training activities during peacetime.... Time which is accrued as a result of prolonged night exercises conducted during the training week is scheduled as compensatory time.[9]

This clearly illustrates the major role time played in the training management of the period.

---

[9] FM 21-5 (1964), 14-15.

SUBJECTS	Rifle Company	Heavy Weapons Company	Heavy Tank Company	Heavy Mortar Company	Regimental Headquarters Company	Battalion Headquarters Company	Service Company	Regimental Medical Company	Battalion
Basic and general (Entire company)									
Antitank and antipersonnel mines; booby traps	8	8							.....
Combat intelligence and counter-intelligence	6	6							.....
Chemical warfare training	8	8							.....
Dismounted drill and ceremonies	18	18							.....
Elementary map and aerial photograph reading	8	8							.....
Maintenance of clothing and equipment	4	4							.....
Extended order	6	6							.....
Grenades	8	8							.....
Identification of mechanized vehicles	2	2							.....
Identification of aircraft	3	3							.....
Inspections	20	20							.....
Interior guard duty	4	4							.....
Military courtesy and customs Articles of War	5	5							.....
Medical subjects, basic	17	17							.....
Motor movement, entrucking and detrucking	4	4							.....
Organization of the Army	2	2							.....
Orientation course	7	7							.....
Personal affairs of military personnel and their dependents	2	2							.....
Marches and bivouacs	36	36							.....
Physical training	40	40							.....
Commander's time	24	24							.....
Tactical training of the infantry soldier	36	36							.....
Tactics of the squad, section and platoon, day and night	62	62							.....
Tactics of the company	16	16							.....
Tactics of the battalion	8	8							.....
Training tests, army or corps	44	44							8
Subtotal—basic and general	398	398	398	398	306	306	306	298	8
Subtotal—technical	218	218	218	218	310	310	310	318	.....
Total	616	616	616	616	616	616	616	616	8

NOTE:
Hours of training for remaining units omitted in illustration only

Unit Training Program 1950 (Figure 1)
(Source: FM 21-5, 1950.)

Subjects	Basic ref	Total hrs ATP 7-18-1	Total Adj hrs	Night tng	Subject Hours Per Week								Remarks
					1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	
a. GENERAL		121	142		18	15	14	12	15	12	12	44	
Character Guidance		2	2				1					1	
Troop Information		8	8		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Physical Training		14	24		4	3	3	3		4	3	4	
First Aid		4	4		4								
Drills and Ceremonies		7	13		3		1	4		3		2	
Inspection		7	8		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Communication Training		2	2		2								
Proficiency Testing		41	41	13½		7			10			24	
Commanders Time		28	24		3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	
Troop Payment		0	8				4					4	
Air Movement Training		8	8								4	4	
b. SQUAD TACTICAL TRAINING		36	32										
(1) Rifle Squad			32	12	26	6							
(a) Squad as Security Element		4	0										
(b) Squad as an Outguard		4	4		4								
(c) Attack		12	12	5	6	6							
(d) Defense		8	8	4	8								
(e) Patrolling		8	8	4	8								
(2) Weapons Squad		32	32	12*									
(a) Principles and Techniques of the Attack		1	1		1								
(b) Selection of Firing Positions and Displacement		3	3		3								
(c) Night Firing		4	4	3*	4								
(d) Movement to Contact		4	4		4								
(e) Attack		8	8	4*	8								To be preceded by Principles and

Rifle Company Master Training Schedule 1964 (Partial)
(Figure 2)
(Source: FM 21-5, 1964.)

Training Concepts

Concepts provide insight to the driving forces in the development of doctrine, and through their study one can see the impact that "time" had on training management doctrine for the period 1945 to 1974. For example the concept of training management in the 1950 version of FM 21-5, Military Training, states, "the planning and direction of training to accomplish the training mission in the time and with the means available."[10] The emphasis was on accomplishing the mission in the "time" available as opposed to accomplishing the mission to a certain level of proficiency.

Another example is found in the 1964 version, FM 21-5, Military Training Management. Training management, "involves the planning, directing, programming, and supervising necessary to accomplish the assigned training mission or requirement in the specified time limit."[11] This is the same concept of training management found in the 1959 version of training management doctrine.

One of the trends found in the training management doctrine during this time is the concept of balance and progression. The basic principle of this concept was to

---

[10] FM 21-5 (1950), 17.

[11] FM 21-5 (1964), 19.

train from simple to more complex, individual to small unit, small unit to large unit. It meant to provide for logical sequencing of training requirements, and rapid progression to the next higher level of training. If we trace this concept through this period, you can see the direct link to time it has.

> For instance, a soldier needs dismounted drill more during his first week of training than during his tenth; therefore, he receives a greater portion of that training in the first week. Drill, however, does not cause neglect of other essentials that he needs during that first week. Military courtesy and customs, medical subjects, weapons training, and other subjects receive their share of training time.[12]

This 1950 version of the training management goes on to say:

> In the same manner, a unit receives proportionate training in essential subjects. To assure a balanced development of its abilities as a fighting unit, it practices defense, security, and tactical road marches, as well as the attack.[13]

What this implied was that equal amounts of time were devoted in the unit's training to the essential subjects re-gardless of the unit's wartime mission. This concept is found in later versions of training management doctrine and continues to be driven by time. "The training officer should distribute night training equally throughout

---

[12] FM 21-5 (1950), 20.

[13] Ibid.

the training phase without disrupting continuity and logical sequence."[14] As you can see, little if any reference to performance to set standards, or training until the unit or individual is proficient in a given task or mission, was talked about.

For the most part the concepts addressed so far can be categorized as dealing primarily with planning and programming of training. One of the major concepts during this period, that sets it apart from others, was in the area of the conduct of training. In almost every version of training management doctrine during this time you can find a section devoted to military instruction, and if there is not, you will find reference to FM 21-6, Techniques of Military Instruction. In the conduct of training, you can see the long term effect that rapid mobilization had on the training management doctrine. The primary vehicle for the conduct of training, carried over from the experiences of training large numbers of conscripts during World War II, was platform instruction. This technique remained deeply rooted in the training management doctrine up until the early to mid-1970's. Again, time played a major role for this technique. Little, if any, doctrine of the time discussed how to conduct training in any methods other than platform instruction. It was believed that instructors were

---

[14] FM 21-5 (1964), 28.

the experts and that not everyone had the traits necessary to be a good instructor. Reliance on a small group of "specialized" instructors to conduct training was the norm. This was a direct result of the techniques used to train large numbers of recruits to be sent to war in Europe and the Pacific.

This technique, in conjunction with the master training schedules of the time, formed a neat package for programming and conducting training. It is interesting to note the relatively constant training management doctrine during this period. Military instruction manuals were found throughout this time frame, and the principles also remained relatively unchanged.

Another significant aspect of the training management doctrine of this time is the concept of evaluation. There seemed to be a general belief that evaluation was separate and distinct from training management, whereas, in the later periods of time covered by this study, evaluation was an integral part of the doctrine. Using the terminology of the time helps to show the difference between current methods of evaluation and those of the past.

"Critique" was the term used for evaluating training performance. It was "a discussion and review of a performance."[15] What is not highlighted in the word "discussion"

---

[15]FM 21-5 (1957), 45.

is that it is one-way. The critiquer presented his evaluation to the evaluated. As you will see in later discussions, there was be a departure from this one-way approach to a more two-way technique. This technique was not inappropriate, since the method of instruction was delivered in the same one-way technique, it made perfectly good sense that the evaluation would be presented in the same manner. Again, time and efficiency were the hallmarks of the evaluation process. There is little evidence that evaluation was an integral part of the training management doctrine of the period. A discussion of the training management process is in order to illustrate this disconnect.

Training Management Process

Training management was best described as a process to organize training activities of the Army. From 1945 to 1974 training management followed a relatively constant methodology. The structure it followed was a series of progressive and sequential steps. Generally speaking, the major steps of the training management process during this period of time were planning, directing, and supervising.

> When the commander receives a training mission, he first estimates the situation to decide on his general training plan. He next develops detailed plans, and prepares and publishes his orders. Then,

he supervises the execution of the orders to be sure that the mission is accomplished.[16]

This process was contained in all versions of the training management doctrine up until 1974. Figure 3 illustrates graphically the training management process as described in the 1950 version of FM 21-5, and which prevailed throughout the period.

---

[16]FM 21-5 (1950), 17.



Training Management Process (Figure 3)
(Source: FM 21-5, 1950.)

Planning

"Planning" for training mirrored the process for operational planning. It started with the analysis of the training mission, and was followed by the estimate of the training situation. The end product of the planning phase was the training plan.

Training missions were broad and general in nature more like objectives than what is now called a "mission." Just as in the operational process, training missions emanate from higher headquarters. Some examples were:

> (1) Attaining and maintaining a prescribed level of combat operational proficiency.
> (2) Conducting replacement training.
> (3) Training a unit for specialized operations.
> (4) In addition to a primary mission, maintaining the capability of providing cadres to other organizations.[17]

It must be remembered that the training tasks were prescribed from the master training schedules.

Once the training mission was analyzed, organization for the conduct of training was decided on. During this period there were two primary methods for organizing training. They were centralized or decentralized organization. "Centralized organization provides for all training or instruction to be given by committees composed of instructors."[18] The intent of centralized training was

---

[17] FM 21-5 (1959), 25.

[18] Ibid.

maximization of time and resources. This is not unlike today's system.

> Decentralized organization releases primary responsibility for detailed planning, direction, and conduct of training to the lowest level of command possible, with higher headquarters retaining only supervisory control and coordination.[19]

It must be emphasized that these techniques also exist today. What is interesting, for this period, is that the method was based on the number of qualified instructors available to teach, which in and of itself emphasizes the centralized method. The end result of the mission analysis step was the training plan. Once the training plan was decided upon it became the basis for the training directive.

Directing

"Directing" was a time management tool used to implement the training program. The directing step incorporated the training programs, schedules, and lesson plans needed to cause training to happen. Throughout the discussion of training programs and schedules, time played a major role. It is interesting to note again that programs were not driven by a predetermined level of proficiency but rather to time available. "A unit training program is the commander's directive that states the training objectives a

---

[19]Ibid.

unit is to achieve in a given period of time."[20] The reverse is true for today. A desired level of proficiency is stated and a program to reach that level is designed. Time, although a critical resource, is not the driving force.

The training schedule is perhaps the clearest example illustrating the doctrine's strict adherence to "training to time."

> The training schedule accounts for every minute of training time. It tells exactly what is to be done and gives a definite time for it. When the troops are given time to take a shower and to change clothes after a march, the schedule so indicates.[21]

Once the training program was completed and disseminated to the unit, execution of training began. At this point the principle of supervision was in effect.

Supervision

The principles of supervision were generally the same as in the training management doctrine found today. The one major difference lies in who is considered a supervisor in the conduct of training.

According to the doctrine from 1945 to 1974, the supervisor was the commander or his designated representative. "Daily supervision of training is the informal day-by-day training inspection made by the commander or his

---

[20] FM 21-5 (1957), 27.

[21] FM 21-5 (1950), 44.

representative."[22] This differs drastically from later doctrines which emphasized that all leaders were to be supervisors of training.

Operational Doctrine

"Doctrine also assisted in the development of organizations and weapons systems...."[23] In addition, operational doctrine, or "How We Intend to Fight," guides "How We Train to Fight." This was particularly true from 1945 to 1974. Proven success in World War II reinforced the ideas that what the Army was doing was the right formula for any future conflict. The United States was the only country possessing atomic weapons. Many questioned the need for a large army and preferred the ability to rapidly mobilize over paying the price tag for something believed obsolete.

> Universal military training was a program for developing a mass army of the type required in the two world wars. After the explosion of the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, however, many thoughtful Americans questioned whether the era of mass armies had not ended.[24]

---

[22]Ibid., 50.

[23]Robert A. Doughty, The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76 Leavenworth Papers No.1 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1979), 1.

[24]Weigley, 500.

This overconfidence in the United States' ability to wage future wars led to much interservice rivalry. The newly formed Air Force possessed all the nuclear weapons and seemed to denigrate the importance of the Army.

As the Cold War began to heat up in the late 1940's, the Army began to focus once again on large scale conventional warfare. "Its doctrine was increasingly oriented toward a European-type battlefield reminiscent of World War II."[25] As 1950 came into sight it is easy to see that the warfighting doctrine remained relatively unchanged, and with it the training management doctrine. Even through the Korean War "the official position was that no real changes in doctrine had occurred or had been necessary during the war."[26] Thus the training management doctrine was also reaffirmed.

The atomic battlefield continued to dominate thought throughout the 1950's and into the early 1960's. Strategic mobility and the possibility of fighting nuclear and non-nuclear war began to emerge in the doctrine, but the principles continued to focus on conventional war in Europe. The effects on training management doctrine were also minimal.

Emphasis on strategic mobility and rapid mobilization continued. It is not until the involvement of the U.S.

---

[25]Doughty, 3.

[26]Ibid., 12.

in Vietnam that we saw any change in doctrine, but its effects on training were minimal. From 1965 to 1972 a definite change in operational doctrine, from conventional to unconventional warfare took place. The biggest and most obvious impact on training management doctrine was in the stated purpose of training. The 1964 version stated the Army training mission as being:

> To attain and maintain the Army at a state of operational effectiveness which will assure the capability of closing with and destruction of the enemy through prompt and sustained combat operations on land, including the seizure, defense or occupation of land, alone or jointly with the Navy, Air Force, or both, and to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations including the support of friendly or allied counterinsurgency operations.[27]

Although the stated mission was quite different than in previous versions of training management doctrine, the methodology and techniques for training remain virtually unchanged from those of the past. It was quite evident that although we were writing about unconventional warfare, our training was still conventional in nature.

After the Vietnam experience, the army turned back to the successes of the past, conventional war in Europe. Whether it was due to the failure in Vietnam or the growth Soviet forces in Eastern Europe is hard to say. In any case, the operational and training management doctrine turned to more familiar environments.

---

[27] FM 21-5 (1964), 2.

Conclusions

Throughout the period 1945 to 1974, training management doctrine remained relatively constant. It is easy to trace this in the manuals of the time. Suddenly if not overnight, however, we see a change in our operational and training management doctrines. These changes brought about many questions as to why they happened. The changes and why they happened will be addressed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

TRAIN TO STANDARD

Introduction

In 1974, Vietnam was over, and the United States could focus on countering the growing Soviet threat in Eastern Europe. This was a much more comfortable environment for the Army to operate in. The experiences of the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict helped solidify the views of the leaders of the Army, especially those of General William E. DePuy, Commander of TRADOC. The Army began to change its educational philosophy of the past into a training philosophy.

> From World War I until 1975, the Army followed the Army Training Program which carried a division from individual training through squad, platoon, company, battalion, regiment or brigade, to division, in each arm or service on the basis of so many hours for this and so many for that. Men and units proceeded through the program whether they learned or not. Frankly, nobody knew. There were few tests and what

> there were, were subjective. If you could survive the schedule you were presumed to be trained.[1]

Performance was now being evaluated to a standard that was not only measurable but universal.

For nearly a decade the Army reduced its numbers, in part due to the growing antimilitary feelings derived by the divisive Vietnam experience. Budget constraints also played an important role in this reduction. The country had just gone through the oil embargo, and suffered from staggering inflation. The cut in the military was one way to ease the pain of recession. The Army was forced to optimize its training dollars, and training to standard helped this process.

The intent of this chapter is to illustrate that the guiding principle in the development of training management doctrine from 1975 until 1984 was the concept of "Train to Standard." As was done in chapter four a look at the purpose of training, the training concepts of the time, the training management process, and the operational doctrine, provides the vehicle for analyzing this concept.

---

[1]Romie L. Brownlee and William J. Mullen, III, Changing an Army. An Oral History of General William E. DePuy, USA Retired (Carisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Military History Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1979), 202.

Purpose of Training

The Army recognized that its performance in past conflict, especially in its early stages, left much to be desired.

> For the military leader confronting the potential of war in the prewar environment, constant effort is required to reduce the gap between training and battle. The luxuries of time and distance the United States Army once enjoyed no longer can serve as brakes on requirements.... The Army may no longer proceed to battle on its own timetable.[2]

Time, although a critical resource, would no longer be the standard by which training would be measured. Instead, "the purpose of training is to prepare soldiers, teams, and units for job performance."[3] This was a clear departure from tying time to the purpose. The new purpose of training during this time caused a chain reaction in the training management doctrine and led to several major changes in how the army trained. "The old style training objective is of course, found throughout the current family of ATP's and ATT's - vague, imprecise, and nonmeasurable."[4] Some of the innovations that emerged to correct this problem were the ARTEP (Army Training and Evaluation Program), the SQT (Skill Qualification Test), and SM (Soldiers Manuals). All three

---

[2]Heller and Stofft, xi.

[3]U.S. Army, FM 21-6, How to Prepare and Conduct Military Training (Washington: Department of the Army, 1975), 4.

[4]Francis A. Nerone and Michael J. Connor, "ARTEP," Infantry (Nov-Dec 1974): 19.

of these products emphasized performance to measurable standards.

> Criterion-referenced instruction composed of tasks, conditions,and standards became the norm to enable trainers to ensure that training accomplished its intended purpose and to clearly establish the efficacy of training performance.[5]

The doctrine clearly pointed out that methods of the past tended to overshadow the true purpose of training. These old methods were outlined and compared to performance-oriented training, which emphasized learning by doing, centered around the soldier not the instructor, focused on tasks not time, and used standards not grades.[6]

The other major training management products during this period of time were four volumes called the Battalion Training Management System (BTMS). BTMS was developed by the Army Training Board and implemented in 1978. Like its predecessor FM 21-6, BTMS emphasized performance oriented training. The four volumes were workshops focused toward the unit leaders up to battalion level. The four volumes were: the Trainer's Workshop (TW); the Platoon Trainer's Workshop (PTW); the Training Supervisor's Workshop (TSW); and the Training Manager's Workshop (TMW).[7] The BTMS

---

[5]Andrew P. O'Meara, Jr., "The Training Revolution," Armor XCII (Nov-Dec 1983): 43.

[6]FM 21-6 (1975), 7.

[7]U.S. Army, The Battalion Training Management System (Ft Eustis: Department of the Army, 1978).

workshop manuals were designed to take the current training management doctrine and assist unit leaders in its implementation. BTMS contained the same purpose of training as FM 21-6. BTMS expanded the "How To" of training management and helped delineate training roles leaders had as a part of a battalion.

The Army after Vietnam was different from that of the preceding three decades. It had become smaller due to budget constraints and an aggressive reduction in force (RIF) in the early 1970's. These actions had made it a virtually hollow force. Probably the most dramatic changes in training management doctrine came about due to the insightful leadership of the commander of the newly formed Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), General William E. DePuy, who recognized that performance would make up for lack of numbers. This revolution began at the roots with a debate between education and training. General DePuy believed "that the Army had moved pretty much towards education and away from training,"[8] and it was time to move back toward training.

---

[8]Brownlee and Mullen, 182.

Training Concepts

Throughout the training concepts of this period of time ran the common thread of "training to standard." This implied that performance was measurable. As a result of these beliefs many of the concepts centered around the training objective. A training objective was:

> a three-part statement that specifies (1) an individual or team/unit Task, (2) the Condition(s) under which the Task is accomplished, and (3) the Training Standard(s) required to demonstrate minimum acceptable proficiency.[9]

The training objective became the center of all training, and "it is but a slight exaggeration to state that the performance-oriented approach begins and ends with the training objective."[10] All individual and collective training tasks were guided by training objectives found in the Soldier's Manuals and ARTEP Manuals. These two sources for training objectives formed the cornerstone of all training programs and thus for all training management.

The methodology of training took a dramatic change from the typical lecture-type training performed from 1945 until 1974, to a method that required performance. "To Gorman [Major General Paul F. Gorman, Deputy Chief of Staff for Training at TRADOC] goes the credit for moving from time

---

[9] FM 21-6 (1975), 172.

[10] Ibid., 4.

oriented training...."[11] Performance-oriented training required the unit or individual to perform to a given standard before moving on to more complex tasks. No longer was an evaluator able to judge a unit or individual by the number of hours spent in training. Instead, actual observed performance of the task was required. Only then could the training evaluator decide if that individual or unit was ready to move on to more complex tasks. This technique aided tremendously in planning future training needs because it identified current levels of proficiency as established by standards found in Soldier's Manuals or ARTEPs. Based on this you could judge what the training needs were. This, of course, was unheard of during the earlier period 1945 to 1974. In the earlier period, assumptions could only be made that it was time to move to the next block of instruction.

It is easy to see why the collective and individual programs of the past were developed. The collective system was devised to speed mobilization. The key was large numbers of units that were knowledgeable in the basic skills. Soldiers needed to transition from civilian life to the regimen of army life. War of attrition was the method that the United States waged against her enemies and little time was available to prepare for conflict. As for individual

---

[11]Brownlee and Mullen, DePuy referring to General Paul Gorman, Deputy Chief of Staff for Training at TRADOC from 1974 to 1977, 202.

programs, the MOS tests were designed as a promotion tool under the personnel management program, and were not intended as a training tool.[12] This was no longer the case in the mid-70's. The enemy could easily out number us and it was quite clear that performance was key to success.

> All of this implies that the U.S. Army must be able to react on very short notice and fight on a battlefield which demands near perfect performance. Success on this battlefield requires that the Army possess a very high level of proficiency in everything it does.[13]

What performance-oriented training did was to set the preconditions for performing tasks required under battlefield conditions. Two other training concepts which revolutionized training management during this period of time were mutiechelon training, and evaluation of training.

Time was not totally ignored, and as will be the case for any training management system, it continued to be a precious resource that could not be squandered. One technique developed to maximize time was multiechelon training. Multiechelon training was "an approach to individual and collective training in units designed to prepare simultaneously different elements of a battalion or separate

---

[12]David S. Blodgett, "Training Proficiency, Readiness and Combat Effectiveness" in "Army Training Study, Concepts of the Army Training System, 1977-1978," (Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), B-9. Comments paraphrased from text.

[13]Ibid., B-4.

company."[14] This technique broke the lock-step method used prior to 1975 by integrating different unit levels of training and simultaneously training them in the same amount of time. No longer was the trainer expected to use a building block approach. The other great benefit derived from multiechelon training was that since the "commander or his designated representative" and the "trained instructor," as you recall from chapter 4, was probably involved in some type of training at his level, the burden of training rested on the shoulders of the immediate supervisor. "Everyone in the chain of command has training responsibility, but training is especially important for NCOs, platoon leaders,and commanders at company, battalion, brigade, and division levels."[15] Committee type training became less and less acceptable.

Evaluation of training during this period of time differed from the training management doctrine of the past. Evaluation was "that process, which by objective and subjective means, seeks to determine the extent of learning progress of individuals and units."[16] There were two basic categories that came under evaluation. They were "Supervise and Critique," and "Post Training Evaluation."

---

[14] FM 21-6 (1975), 169.

[15] Collins, 31.

[16] FM 21-6 (1975), 167.

Supervising and critiquing, which was conducted during the training itself, "involve[d] constant supervision and correction of individual and unit performance."[17] The difference between past techniques and this one lies in when the critique was conducted and who conducted it. Critiques were performed during the conduct of training versus waiting until the training was complete. This was important in two respects. First, mistakes were corrected before training was completed thus avoiding training to the wrong standard, and secondly, the supervisor, not a "trained instructor," conducted the critique. The fact that standards, not time, drove the training becomes more apparent.

The post training evaluation was a more formal method of evaluating and recording individual and unit performance. It involved conducting evaluation after the completion of training, and provided feedback to the individual or unit that had completed the training. The evaluation centered around comparing performance against the known standards found in the Soldier's Manuals or ARTEPs. Although a certain amount of subjectivity crept into the evaluation, the chances of this became less likely. The other important benefit of this technique was that records used during the evaluation would now be used to plan future training needs.

---

[17]Ibid., 69.

Training Management Process

As described in the 1975 version of FM 21-6, training management is:

> the art of employing limited resources (human, physical, financial and time) in a manner that permits efficient and effective development of individuals and units so they can successfully accomplish their peace and wartime missions.[18]

During this period a three-step process is used to organize and conduct training. The steps were:

Step 1. Describe the desired results of training

Step 2. Prepare to conduct training

Step 3. Conduct training to standard

Within the confines of this three step process appeared subsets which closely paralleled the mission analysis for tactical decision making. Figure 4 helps illustrate this training management process. A few steps will be highlighted.

---

[18]Ibid., 172.



Training Management Process (Figure 4)
(Source: FM 21-6, 1975.)

During the first step, a clear understanding of what must be accomplished during training was established. Guidance was received from higher as to the standards that were to be met. The end result of training was thus outlined.

The second step involved the development of intermediate training objectives that must be performed in order to accomplish the objective set by the next higher commander. The training sequence was organized and all administrative requirements to conduct the training were made accordingly.

The final step entailed performing the training to the prescribed standards. Supervision was continual during this step. Evaluation of the training against a known standard completed the step.[19]

Operational Doctrine

With the close of the Vietnam War came an end to the dominance of counterinsurgency doctrine. The strategic reality of the world and the lethality of modern weapons necessitated relooking and reshaping our "how to fight" doctrine. "General DePuy, as well as many other observers, saw in the October War indications that future conventional warfare would be significantly different, if not altogether

---

[19]Ibid., 8. Steps summarized from information given.

revolutionary...."[20] The Arab-Israeli War in 1973 had a profound impact on leaders across the army. For ten years we had focused on Southeast Asia and based our training and operational doctrine on endeavors that were important but which did not involve our vital national interests.

> Vietnam-experienced paratroopers who waited in full combat gear near their aircraft at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina, during President Richard M. Nixon's worldwide military alert learned that they would not have been prepared to fight tanks in the Sinai Desert. The Middle East War posed the questions and spurred the Army to seek solutions while providing men like General DePuy with a compelling and universally recognized case in point. If TRADOC was to coordinate its initiatives in training, officer schooling, and combat developments so that all focused on preparing the Army for wars like the October War, then each of those initiatives must be founded on a common concept of how the Army should fight in such a war. The articulation of that concept must precede the other initiatives.[21]

Active Defense doctrine grew out of the concept that the Army must be able to fight outnumbered and win.

> The stated aim of the operations manual was to set forth the basic concepts of the U.S. Army doctrine that would be the foundation of service school instruction and guide for training and combat developments throughout the Army.[22]

---

[20]Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, Leavenworth Papers No. 16 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988), 30-31.

[21]Ibid., 36.

[22]John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982, TRADOC Historical Monograph Series (Fort Monroe, VA: Historical Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984), 6.

The results of the doctrine had to be measurable. Three major precepts had to be met if the Army was to realize success on the next battlefield. They were: prepare to win the first battle of the next war; prepare units to fight outnumbered, and to win; and be ready to fight and win now. "Readiness and effectiveness were keynotes of the volume.[FM 100-5, Operations] Training had to yield standards and techniques that matched the realities of the modern battlefield, in combined arms terms."[23] The ARTEP became the bridge between the operational doctrine and the required standards that needed to be met for success on the battlefield.

Conclusions

General William E. DePuy had a profound impact on shaping the changes in training management doctrine in the early 1970's. The lessons learned from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War helped change how the Army viewed the world, as well as its role in protecting the vital interests of the nation. Performance to measurable standards helped create numerous training techniques that quickly proved that traditional methods of training were insufficient to meet the needs of an Army that must quickly conduct combat operations around the world.

---

[23]Ibid. Included in this citation are the three major precepts of the 1976 version of FM 100-5, Operations.

From 1975 until 1984, "Train to Standard" remained as the concept that drove the training management doctrine. The revolutionary changes implemented during this timeframe remained a viable part of the current training management doctrine. The next chapter will address the transition from training to standards to training to mission.

CHAPTER 6

TRAIN TO MISSION

Introduction

As of 1984 the nation had learned many lessons in the preceding decade. It had ended the war in Vietnam, watched an army virtually disintegrate, and changed to the all volunteer force. Once again the post-conflict environment, so familiar to the United States in the past, made many senior leaders realize that should the Soviet Union cross into central Europe we would not be able to contain its expansion. What led us to these conclusions and what was the Army's method for restoring its capabilities?

The Army had made tremendous strides in the mid to late 1970's but units were still not reaching the levels of proficiency desired by the senior leadership. The ARTEPs specified the standards that had to be attained. Even though more training dollars were slowly beginning to flow into the Army under the Reagan Administration, things were not as they had been envisioned.

Training had been diluted by two key problem areas. The first was that the system for developing training was

based on the fielding of new equipment. As technology expanded, new systems came on line very quickly. Major weapons systems were acquired whether there was a need for them or not. As a result, training developers were constantly playing catch-up with the combat developers whose systems prospered during the DePuy years.

The second problem was found in the ARTEP system. Units were expected to perform to standard on all missions found in their particular ARTEP manual. For the average commander and soldier it was simply overwhelming.[1] The number of missions in each manual made it impossible to be proficient in any more than a few missions, and training missions held the same priority as the numerous administrative missions a unit was expected to execute. Additionally no ARTEPs existed for combat service support units.

The solutions to both of these problems appeared in what is known as the Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS) and in modifications that produced a more Mission-oriented training management doctrine through the CAPSTONE program.

> For many years, material acquisition has dictated how the Army organized, trained, and fought. The Concept Based Requirements System (CBRS) is a formal process designed to introduce the proper order of

---

[1]Carl E. Vuono, telephone interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 APR 1992.

decisions into how the Army will fight on future battlefields.[2]

Figure 5 outlines the system.



Concept Based Requirements System (Figure 5)
(Source: Changing an Army, 1979.)

---

[2]U.S. Army, TRADOC, U.S. Army Tra...ng and Doctrine Command, PRIMER (Fort Monroe: U.S. Training and Doctrine Command, 1984), 18.

The intent of this chapter is to continue to look at training management doctrine from 1985 to 1988 by tracing the purpose of training, the key training concepts, the training management process, and the operational doctrine for this time-frame. It will be quite evident that the focus of the training management doctrine during this period of time is "Train to Mission."

Purpose of Training

There were three iterations of training management doctrine that emerged between 1985 to 1988. In every case the purpose of training reflected the importance of the unit mission. For example FM 25-1, Training, dated 1985 states, "Units train to perform the tasks and meet the standards necessary to accomplish their operational ARTEP missions."[3] Both FC 25-100, Training the Force, dated November, 1985 and FM 25-100, Training the Force, dated November, 1988 reflect similar purposes for training. "Training is the means for ensuring mission accomplishment...."[4] and "The training focus is on our wartime missions."[5]

---

[3]U.S. Army, FM 25-1, Training (Washington: Department of the Army, 1985), 9.

[4]U.S. Army, FC 25-100 Training the Force (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 1985), 1-3.

[5]FM 25-100 (1988), 1-1.

The driving force that changed the focus of training was the realization that not every task could be trained to acceptable levels of proficiency. There was not enough time to try and do all tasks well.[6] Some sort of constraining mechanism had to be devised. That mechanism became the "Mission." The total focus of training would be delineated by the unit's wartime mission.

Probably the most important influence on training during this period was CBRS and the CAPSTONE program. CBRS identified the needs of the Army based on analysis of the threat, army missions, technology, and historical studies.

> These four pillars define, to the extent possible, what the Army must do, how it was done in the past, the capabilities and shortcomings of potential enemies, and future capabilities which might be available to either side. From this grows a concept of how to best accomplish the assigned Army missions.[7]

The actual solutions to these needs fall into the categories of doctrine, organization, materiel, and training. This process directly linked Army missions to training. Not only did this improve the direction of training of the Army, but more importantly, was one of the first steps in the justification process of the Army's budget before Congress.
The business of Army training was directly linked to mission

---

[6]Vuono, telephone interview.

[7]TRADOC Primer (1984), 18.

accomplishment. The concepts espoused in the training management doctrine clearly demonstrated this evolution.

The CAPSTONE program tied unit training directly to wartime mission accomplishment. It required the wartime commander to provide subordinate commanders with their missions.

Training Concepts

From 1985 to 1988 the centerpiece for all training concepts became the mission. The major concepts that formed the core of training management doctrine were battle focus, the mission, and the mission essential task list. Another important concept falls under evaluation, the After Action Review (AAR).

"Battle focus is a concept used to derive peacetime training requirements from wartime missions."[8] What distinguished battle focus from training concepts of the past was that it allowed leaders at all levels of the Army to recognize that units could not attain or maintain proficiency of all tasks and that a conscious risk-taking approach to a unit's training program had to be taken.[9] Battle focus also established a direct linkage between individual and collective tasks for a unit. (Figure 6)

---

[8]FM 25-100 (1988), 1-7.

[9]Ibid., 1-7. Paraphrased comment on what battle focus allows leaders to realize about their training.



Battle Focus Task Crosswalk (Figure 6)
(Source: FM 25-100, 1988.)

Battle focus was more than a concept. What it attempted to do was form a mind-set that everything your unit performed must contribute to preparing for that wartime mission. This is not to say that a unit would never conduct missions that were not directly associated to its wartime mission. This would be naive to say the least. What it meant was that even when a unit was conducting nonmission-related tasks, opportunities within those tasks could come about that enhance the proficiency of your wartime mission. For example, when executing post guard and detail, a unit should attempt to maintain unit integrity, which enhances the junior leaders' command and control capabilities.

The organization's wartime mission was another important concept in the training management doctrine during this period of time. Mission was defined as "the primary task assigned to an individual, unit, or force. It usually contains the elements of who, what, where, and the reasons therefore, but seldom specifies how."[10] The mission was the start point for determining how a unit or individual was going to train. The key tools for determining the mission were operational plans and external directives. The missions contained in both these sources became the foundation to the training tasks that were required to be performed by a unit. Examples of external directives included Mission

---

[10]Ibid., Glossary-5.

Training Plans, Mobilization Plans, Installation Wartime Transition and Deployment Plans, and Force Integration Plans.[11] What is interesting and also different about this training concept is that missions were tailored to the units, and not menu driven where every unit conducted the same training tasks. Like units might and usually did have different wartime missions, therefore the training programs were structured differently. No more did units train for a designated number of hours on tasks picked from a master training plan, and no longer were units to train on every possible task which that type unit might or might not be asked to perform. The analysis of these wartime missions led to a series of tasks that had to be mastered in order to succeed in combat. And who was there better to analyze the mission but the commander.[12]

> Army organizations cannot achieve and sustain proficiency on every possible task. Therefore, commanders must selectively identify the tasks that are essential to accomplishing the organization's wartime mission.[13]

The result of this process was the Mission Essential Task List (METL).

---

[11]Ibid., 2-1.

[12]Vuono, telephone interview.

[13]FM 25-100 (1988), 2-1.

One of the most interesting aspects of the METL is that it was developed without regard to resource constraints and there was no priority given to the tasks on the list. By definition the list identified all tasks required for success in combat. Once the METL was formulated, the next higher commander approved it and in essence it became a contract between the subordinate and senior commanders from which to plan and execute training.

Evaluation, by definition, remained basically unchanged from previous training management doctrine. The fundamental difference was in the method by which it was executed. With the advent of the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, CA, and later the Joint Readiness Center JRTC at Fort Chaffee, AR, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) at Hoenfels, GER, a technique called the After Action Review (AAR) was born.

> An AAR is a structured review process that allows training participants to discover for themselves what happened, why it happened, and how it can be done better. The AAR is a professional discussion that requires active participation of those being trained.[14]

The doctrine emphasized that the AAR was not a critique, and accentuated the positive aspects of the training session. This is quite different from evaluation techniques espoused in the training management doctrine of 1945 to 1984, where the main focus was the critique.

---

[14]Ibid., 5-1.

Training Management Process

The structure of the training management process took a fundamental change during this latter period of time. What was basically a linear approach to the training management process became a cyclical process. (See Figure 7)



Training Management Cycle (Figure 7)
(Source: FM 25-100, 1988.)

There were four phases to the training management cycle: METL Development; Planning; Execution; and Assessment. The METL development process translated the wartime missions into the Mission Essential Task List. This process was discussed in detail above. Figure 8 illustrates this process.



METL Development Process (Figure 8)
(Source: FM 25-100, 1988.)

The second step in the training management cycle was "Planning." "Planning is an extension of the battle focus concept that links organizational METL with the subsequent execution and evaluation of training."[15] Along with the METL, leaders provided an assessment of the current level of proficiency and compared that with the standards outlined in the ARTEP Mission Training Plans (AMTPs) and to the doctrine in the how-to-fight manuals. The commander then provided

[15]Ibid., 3-1.

his training vision for the unit, in essence, what level of proficiency he expected to train to. The difference in these two levels of proficiency provided the basis for the strategy to close the difference in the two. This became the Training Plan. (See Figure 9)



Training Planning Process (Figure 9)
(Source: FM 25-100, 1988.)

The next step in the training management cycle was "Execution." Simply put, this was the conduct of the planned training. Assessment was the final step in the cycle which provided necessary feedback for modifying current training plans and input for future training plans. The key aspect of the cycle, as opposed to the linear processes of the train to time and train to standard timeframes, was that it was continuous and built upon past failures or achievements. The other processes started over once completed and did not take into consideration the current state of proficiency.

Operational Doctrine

A firm link between operational doctrine and training management doctrine was finally established during this period of time by the watch-words, "Train as We Fight." AirLand Battle Doctrine, which directed mission-type orders, drove a change in the old training management doctrine toward the battle-focused approach. "Training is the means for ensuring mission accomplishment and sustaining readiness of all functional systems of the combined arms team necessary to execute AirLand Battle doctrine."[16]

The training mission reflected in the training management doctrine was a direct reflection of the AirLand Battle doctrine. It stated, "The Army training mission is to prepare soldiers, leaders, and units to deploy, fight, and win in combat at any intensity level, anywhere, anytime."[17] The offensive spirit espoused in the operational doctrine could be clearly seen in this training mission.

Execution of the new operational doctrine required fundamental changes in how we organized and executed our training. Risk taking, a key concept in the operational doctrine, drove conscious decisions to cut down the number of training tasks found on unit Mission Essential Task Lists. The same innovative spirit found in AirLand Battle

---

[16] FC 25-100 (1985), 1-3.

[17] FM 25-100 (1988), 1-1.

doctrine was found in the principles in the training management doctrine. The only way the operational doctrine could hope to be successful was if the training philosophy complemented it. "The capstone training manual was written to take its place alongside FM 100-5 Operations, and FM 22-100, Military Leadership,as a part of "train, fight, lead" manuals."[18] Without such a linkage the training challenges of AirLand Battle doctrine could not have been met.

Conclusions

Training management doctrine from 1985 to 1988 was clearly driven by the concept of "Train to Mission." From the battle focused METL development process to the execution of training through the tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine, mission played the prominent role.

---

[18]Anne W. Chapman, The Army's Training Revolution 1973-1990 An Overview, TRADOC Historical Study Series (Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,1991), 29.

CHAPTER 7

"No More Task Force Smiths."

Introduction

The current environment for the Army is one which is not entirely new. Budget cuts which in the past have shaped its training management doctrine are likely to have the same effect in the future. The size of the force in the next five years is likely to effect training and its doctrine also. The world situation will continue to demand a well trained Army to be prepared to fight and win anywhere in the world alongside coalition forces. Reaction time will be limited due to the proliferation and lethality of modern weapons. Technology will continue to give the end to those who can develop it and effectively use it. Automation will undoubtedly speed the management of training in the future. But execution will always be the key to success. The only way to execute is by continuous realistic training.

The Future

Three major trends will be prevalent and have a direct impact on Army training management doctrine. They are changes in the Army's operational doctrine, operating tempo dollars (OPTEMPO), and lack of certainty for contingency areas of responsibility.

As the Army updates its operational doctrine to fit the needs of warfighting into the 21st century, the need to continually update the way the Army manages its training will be present. Creative ways to train to the new warfighting standards will be critical if the Army is to maintain its ability to perform successfully in the next conflict. "Doctrine has two fundamental purposes: to link strategy and force structure, and to guide training."[1] Operational doctrine will continue to drive the Army's training management doctrine. If it does not, the Army could fall prey to the same shortcomings it suffered during past conflicts. (See Figure 10)

The amount of training dollars and restraints on the budgeting process will continue for the army. The government will continue to shrink the defense budget and funnel those dollars to domestic programs.

---

[1]Stone and Sullivan, 36.



"NO MORE TASK FORCE SMITHS."

Trained and Ready (Figure 10)
(Source: "Army Posture Statement, FY93," 1992.)

The results of smaller amounts of training dollars will force training managers and leaders at all levels to ensure training management doctrine emphasizes even more efficient use of resources than ever before. Heavier reliance on simulation and automation tools both to conduct training and manage it will be a must. The smaller Active Component will require a larger role by Reserve Components should a crisis occur. The limited number of training days afforded to the Reserve Components further exacerbates the problem of maintaining high standards of proficiency on a smaller OPTEMPO.

Finally, the uncertainty in the strategic environment requires much more flexibility in the Army's ability to execute a variety of contingency missions. This lack of certainty challenges the Army's training management doctrine to provide the tools for leaders to be able to develop training programs that can fulfill the needs that will occur. Forces will no longer have the luxury of preparing to fight only in central Europe or some other specific area of operation. They must be prepared to fight in any part of the world in any type of conflict. The demands on a training management system to provide this type of readiness will be tremendous.

Conclusions

This study has addressed the evolution of the Army's training management doctrine from 1945 to 1988. Through

descriptive analysis, the changes in the purpose of training, the key training concepts, the training management process, and the impact of the Army's operational doctrine have been discussed.

From 1945 to 1974 the Army's training management doctrine focused on training to time. The common thread throughout this period was that proficiency and readiness of individuals and units was based on the number of hours devoted to the training program not on performance. Time played an important role in the purpose of training and the training concepts in the doctrine. This single factor drove how the Army trained and managed its training for nearly thirty years. Fundamental changes in the Army's training management doctrine occurred by the mid 1970's due to several reasons. They included budgetary constraints, lessons from the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, and changes in the Army's operational doctrine.

In 1975 a new concept emerged that revolutionized how the Army trained. This concept was called training to standard. Under the guidance of General William E. DePuy, the Army developed a series of programs that required performance by individuals and units to measurable standards. These standards were found in Soldiers Manuals and ARTEP Manuals. The key training concepts and methods for conducting training embodied training to standard. By the early 1980's, leaders began to realize that the peacetime demands

for time and the wartime requirements for readiness made it virtually impossible for soldiers and units to remain proficient in the myriad of tasks required by the training programs. The results of this realization led to evolutionary changes in the Army's training management doctrine.

By 1985 the evolutionary change that emerged required that units focus their training on their wartime mission. This battle focus allowed units to pare down the number of tasks to a few mission essential tasks that must be trained to acceptable levels of proficiency in order to be successful in battle. This risk-taking approach to training dovetailed into the AirLand Battle doctrine. The key player and driver of change for this period was General Carl E. Vuono, Commander of the Training and Doctrine Command. His belief that units and soldiers should focus on their wartime mission cut down the number of tasks to train on. The complementary doctrines permanently fused the importance of operational and training doctrine.

As the Army moves into the next century it is important that its officers and non-commissioned officers understand the lessons of past training mistakes. The U.S. Army can ill-afford to relive the past performances such as Task Force Smith. Training will continue to be the linch-pin to success in future conflicts.

APPENDIX

The following are copies of letters sent to General (Ret) William E. DePuy and General (Ret) Carl E. Vuono requesting information on the reasons Army training management doctrine changed under their tenures:

General(Ret) William E. DePuy
Highfield
Delaplane, VA 22025

Dear General DePuy: March 31, 1992

Sir, my name is Major Anthony J. Gasbarre, Jr. I am currently a student at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. I am working on a Masters of Military Arts and Sciences degree as a part of my studies. The thesis I am researching is the evolution of training management doctrine from 1945 to 1988.

My research has thusfar led me to discover that one of the most revolutionary changes in training management doctrine took place during your tenure as Commander of TRADOC. This change, of course, was from the traditional methods of "Training to Time" found in the doctrine from 1945 to 1974, to the techniques of "Training to Standard" espoused in FM 21-6, How to Prepare and Conduct Military Training, dated November 1975.

Any information concerning the reasons why these revolutionary changes occurred will be invaluable to my research. Of particular interest is the effect our operational doctrine of the time may have had on changes in the training management doctrine. Thank You for your time. Any information will be greatly appreciated.

My address is 318-5 Doniphan Drive, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 66027. TEL (913) 682-0433.

Sincerely,
Anthony J. Gasbarre, Jr.
Major, USA

General(Ret) Carl E. Vuono
4508 Kerrybrooke Drive
Alexandria, VA 22310

Dear General Vuono: March 31, 1992

Sir, my name is Major Anthony J. Gasbarre, Jr. I am currently a student at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. I am working on a Masters of Military Arts and Sciences degree as a part of my studies. The thesis I am researching is the evolution of training management doctrine from 1945 to 1988.

My research has led me to discover that one of the most important changes in training management doctrine took place during your tenure as Commander of TRADOC. This change, of course, was from training all tasks found in unit ARTEP manuals to training on Mission Essential Tasks derived through the Battle Focus process.

Any information concerning the reasons why this change occurred will be invaluable to my research. Of particular interest is the role our operational doctrine may have had on changes in the training management doctrine. Thank You for your time. Any information will be greatly appreciated.

My address is 318-5 Doniphan Drive, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 66027. TEL (913) 682-0433.

Sincerely,
Anthony J. Gasbarre, Jr.
Major, USA

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Addington, Larry H. The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.

Babbie, Earl. The Practice of Social Research. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1986.

Collins, Arthur S. Jr. Common Sense Training. A Working Philosophy for Leaders Novato: Presidio Press, 1978.

Gabriel, Richard A. and Paul L. Savage. Crisis In Command. Mismanagement in the Army. New York: Hill and Wang, 1978.

Goulden, Joseph C. Korea. The Untold Story of the War. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1982.

Hastings, Max and Simon Jenkins. The Battle for the Falk lands. New York: W.W. Norton and Company,Inc., 1984.

Heller, Charles E. and William A. Stofft, editors. America's First Battles. 1776-1965. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986.

Jessup, John E., Jr. and Robert W. Coakley, editors. A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982.

Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam. A History. The First Complete Account of Vietnam at War. New York: Penguin Books, 1984.

Paret, Peter, editor. Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War. A History of the Military Strategy and Policy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977.

Weigley, Russell F. History of the United States Army. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967.

Government Documents

U.S. Army. FC 25-100, Training the Force. Fort Leavenworth: Government Printing Office, 1985.

U.S. Army. FM 21-5, Military Training. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1950.

U.S. Army. FM 21-5, Military Training. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1957.

U.S. Army. FM 21-5, Military Training. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1959.

U.S. Army. FM 21-5, Military Training Management. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1964.

U.S. Army. FM 21-6, Techniques of Military Instruction. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1954.

U.S. Army. FM 21-6, Techniques of Military Instruction. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1967.

U.S. Army. FM 21-6, How to Prepare and Conduct Military Training. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1975.

U.S. Army. FM 25-1, Training. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1985.

U.S. Army. FM 25-2(Test), Unit Commander's Guide. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974.

U.S. Army. FM 25-2(Test), How to Manage Training in Units. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982.

U.S. Army. FM 25-2, Unit Training Management. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1984.

U.S. Army. FM 25-3, Training in Units. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1984.

U.S. Army. FM 25-100, Training the Force. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1988.

U.S. Army. TC 25-7, How to Develop Training Management Skills in the Unit. Washington, D.C. Department of the Army, 1985.

U.S. Army. TRADOC PAMPHLET 350-8, TRADOC Primer. Fort Monroe: Government Printing Office, 1984.

U.S. Army. TRADOC PAMPHLET 350-8, TRADOC Primer. Fort Monroe: Government Printing Office, 1988.

U.S. Army. TRADOC Regulation 11-15, Concept Based Requirements System. Fort Monroe: Government Printing Office, 1986.

U.S Congress. Unit Training. How it is Evaluated and Reported to the Congress. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1986.

Studies

Chapman, Anne W. The Army's Training Revolution, 1973-1990. An Overview. TRADOC Historical Study Series, Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1991.

Doughty, Robert A. The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976. Leavenworth Paper no.1, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1979.

Gabel, Christopher R. Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II. Leavenworth Paper no.12, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985.

Herbert, Paul H. Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations. Leavenworth Paper no.16, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988.

Romjue, John L. From Active Defense to AirLand Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982. TRADOC Historical Monograph Series, Fort Monroe, VA: Office of the Command Historian, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1984.

Periodicals and Articles

Lynch, William R. and Garth T. Bloxham. "Training in the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized)," Military Review, (September 1983): 34-48.

Nerone, Francis A. and Michael J. Connor. "ARTEP," Infantry, (Nov-Dec 1974): 17-23.

O'Meara, Andrew P. and Raymond C. Hartjen. "Systems Approach to Combat Training," Army, (January 1985): 37-41.

O'Meara, Andrew P. "The Training Revolution," Armor, (Nov-Dec 1983): 43-45.

Richardson, William R. "TRADOC: Army's Source of Well Trained Soldiers," Army, (October 1983): 50-60.

Unpublished Materials

Barnes, L.R. "Total Force Training: A Study of Company-Level Commander's Training in Armored Cavalry Regiments in the National Guard." Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985.

Barnhill, Anthony L. "Train as You Will Fight: Factors Affecting Development of a Strategy to Train National Guard Units to the Level Organized." Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990.

Battelle Pacific Northwest Labs. "Automation Impact Study of Army Training Management." Richland, WA. January 1988.

Blumenfeld, Aaron. "AirLand Battle Doctrine: Evolution or Revolution? A Look inside the U.S. Army." Bachelor of Arts and Science Thesis, Princeton University, 1989.

Human Resources Research Organization. "Perspectives on Battalion Training Management." Alexandria, VA. September 1980.

John, Roger M. "Training/Training Management at CGSC." Individual Study Project, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1975.

Jones, G.A. "Operationalizing Field Manual 25-100, Training the Force." Individual Study Project, U.S. Army War College,1988.

Walters, D.F. "Implementation of FM 25-100 in the Heavy Division." Individual Study Project, U.S. Army War College, 1983.

Willison, Gary S. "The Battalion Commander's Guide to Successful Training Management." Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1980.

U.S. Army. "Army Training Study." Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1978.

U.S. Army. "Battalion Training Management System." Department of the Army, Fort Eustis, VA, 1978.

U.S. Army. "Forces Training Management Assessment." Secretary of the Army Inspector General, Washington, D.C., 1988.

U.S. Army. "The United States Army Posture Statement, FY 93." Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1992.

Interviews and Oral Histories

United States Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
Oral History Interview
William E. DePuy

Other Sources

Author's Telephonic Interview on 23 April 1992. Notes in his possession.
Carl E. Vuono

Video Tape Briefing on Army Drawdown Presented by Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army, January, 1992.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

2. Defense Technical Information Center
   Cameron Station
   Alexandria, Virginia 22314

3. Dr. Christopher R. Gabel
   Combat Studies Institute
   USACGSC
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

4. LTC Ronald E. Schupner
   Center for Army Leadership
   USACGSC
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

5. MAJ John R. Swanson
   Directorate Low Intensity Conflict Proponencies
   USACGSC
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

6. Mr. Harry Weeks
   Media Support Center
   Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027